Risk assessment and management represent critical elements of developing a CO 2 storage site and assuring its viability throughout the project lifetime. Risk assessment and management informs the selection of an appropriate storage site, establishing the requirements for project viability in the initial phases, and subsequently as part of the development process to mitigate possible events, and to plan appropriate surveillance with considered intervention options. It needs to be an effective communication tool that captures the complexities and uncertainties of the site to the satisfaction of regulator and the public. We have used the In Salah CCS Project, a Joint Venture of BP, Sonatrach and Statoil, in providing a means of evaluating and benchmarking three Risk assessment methodologies to understand their strengths and to illustrate their power to elucidate the risks and the viability of the project. We hope to extend the use of the comprehensive In Salah dataset to benchmark other risk assessment methodologies.
Introduction
The In Salah CO 2 storage project in Algeria is a Joint Venture (JV) of BP, Statoil and Sonatrach. Since mid 2004, over 3 million tonnes (Mt) of CO 2 has been injected, via three horizontal wells into a deep saline formation adjacent to the Krechba gas field, a shallow dipping anticline. The storage interval is a ~20m thick Carboniferous reservoir, at a depth of ~1800m with porosity of 13% and permeability of 10mD. It is anticipated that the CO 2 will eventually migrate up-dip into the crest of the structure as the hydrocarbon gas is produced. The sandstone is overlain by a series of Carboniferous mudstones up to 950m thick, which are then overlain by anhydrite cement at the Hercynian unconformity, which acts as the ultimate seal for the storage system. Overlying the anhydrite is a series of thick Cretaceous sandstone and mudstone formations that make up the regional potable water aquifer [1] .
Monitoring of the stored CO 2 is carried out by a Joint Industry Project (JIP) -a collaboration of BP, Sonatrach and Statoil, with co-funding from US DoE and EU DG Research [2] . An initial risk assessment for the project was carried out in 2003 to provide an overall assessment of the project and in particular to define the potential monitoring program. The risk registry was considered under the following categories: Surface facilities, injection well risks, early CO 2 breakthrough, migration out of injection interval, wellbore leakage, and environmental damage. The project started injection in late 2004 and a re-evaluation of performance was carried out in 2008. This took the form of a risk assessment by CO2TECH (CO2CRC's commercial group) using URS's RISQUE technology adapted for CO 2 storage QRA [3] . Subsequently the Certification Framework (CF) developed within the CCP phase 2 research program was retroactively applied to the project using information only available before injection commenced and again that available up to the time of the URS study in September 2008 [4] . In July 2010, after additional seismic and other data was acquired and interpreted an additional URS RISQUE QRA was performed and fed into the QRTT protocol.
The In Salah project is pushing the boundaries of feasible CO 2 storage systems, with very low permeability and a narrow pressure window between pre-injection pressure and fracture pressure. The low permeability and high injection pressures required to store the planned volume of CO 2 demonstrate that effective risk management is a key requirement for success in this project.
Definition of leakage from the container requires the storage containment system to be precisely defined. Containment is defined as the ability of a geological storage project to retain the target volume of CO 2 within the intended storage complex. For In Salah, leakage was defined as any mass of CO 2 that passes through the top of the anhydrite overlying the Hercynian unconformity or passes out of the Krechba lease area. This definition was similar in all three assessments with some refinement within the Certification Framework process.
Risk Quantification -RISQUE approach
The URS RISQUE method [5] is a quantitative risk assessment technique that characterises risk in terms of both likelihood of an identified risk event occurring (such as CO 2 leakage) and consequence of the event in terms of volume lost/not stored. The approach and calculation of risk is quite simple in this method, a facilitated workshop environment enables all aspects of risk and uncertainty to be rapidly laid out and rationally considered by a formal team of site specific experts. The result is that risk response can then be the main focus of risk management activity. Storage risk is assessed as two components of technical storage system performance: Containment; the ability of the storage system to contain most of the injected CO 2 , and Effectiveness; the ability of the storage system to receive the planned CO 2 injection volume [6] , [7] . For the purpose of this paper only the containment risk assessment aspects are reviewed.
Based on the definition of Risk (quotient) as the likelihood of the event times its impact, the process of quantification of containment risks is to systematically define each risk's likelihood of occurrence, with CL01 and CL99 range (Confidence Limit, Figure 1A ), the impact in terms of leakage rate (tonnes per year) with a most likely (CL50) and conservative estimate (CL 95), the number of these risks (e.g. number of wells), and the duration of loss (time that the event would be active). A qualitative basis chart is used to link to a quantitative meaning to the likelihood input, assuring consistency in estimation ( Figure 1B) , while leakage rate impacts utilise either specific modelling outputs or literature [8] . The Risk Quotient for 'migration direction' was determined where a likelihood of the event was assessed a value of a 'possible' (0.01) to 'highly probable' (0.1), (using the table in Figure 1B) , with a leakage rate of 200,000 to 250,000 T/yr. The leakage rate was based on future injection rates and modeled plume migration. It was assumed that, if this risk was to eventuate, there would be a delay in the detection of up to 5 years due to data acquisition, interpretation and implementation of a response strategy.
Three response actions were evaluated to demonstrate the effect of differing responses on the risk quotient. The expert group evaluated the relative reduction in likelihoods and/or consequences that could reasonably be achieved through implementing three possible risk response actions shown in figure 3 .
The histogram display in Figure 2 shows the dominant risks assessed in 2008. The 'Y' axis is the risk quotient in a logarithmic scale. The profile shows that the dominant containment risk event is migration direction, which would be considered to be an unacceptable risk since it exceeds the target risk for a single event by around one order of magnitude. This is the risk of CO 2 migration north out of the containment lease line. However the lease line is a geologically arbitrary feature, so were CO 2 to cross it, the consequences would not constitute a leak to atmosphere, just a leak to another lease. All of the other containment risk events show risk levels that are more than one order of magnitude less than the target for individual events, and are therefore considered to pose an acceptable risk.
Migration direction poses around two orders of magnitude more risk than the second highest event, well leakage; the well leakage risk represents the sum of four well leakage categories. There are many potential processes that could allow this loss of containment by migration direction. These include the uncertainty associated with the location and depth of the structural spill-point and the possibility of a fractured reservoir providing a permeable pathway to the spill-point. In addition, decreasing reservoir quality to the immediate south may back fill CO 2 deeper than the spill point, or the lower seal may be fractured effectively decreasing the spill-point depth.
While an important first step in assurance of CO 2 plume location, the acquisition of new seismic and a monitoring well does not greatly reduce migration direction risk. This is due to the likely confirmation of the risk with less uncertainty rather than any major change to the project. Re-defining the storage area or stopping injection at Kb-502 and Kb-503 and installing two to three new injection wells appear to be two possible effective methods to reduce the risk of migration through the northern lease line. However given the minimal impact on resources beyond that lease line, this was not recommended. 
Certification Framework
The Certification Framework (CF) conceptualizes the storage system into source, conduits (wells and faults), and compartments such as Hydrocarbon and Mineral Resource (HMR), Underground Source of Drinking Water (USDW), Health and Safety (HS), Near-Surface Environment (NSE), and Emission Credits and Atmosphere (ECA). The CO 2 Leakage Risk (CLR) is the product of the probability of intersection of leakage paths with compartments and the impact (i) which is the consequence to a compartment, evaluated by proxy concentrations or fluxes. If the CLR is below predetermined thresholds, the site can be certified. The CF case study has been carried out as if it were done at two key times; (1) pre-injection, to be comparable to the JIP internal assessment, and (2) as of September, 2008, to be consistent with the URS assessment. A separate paper summarizing the application of the CF to In Salah has been prepared for this conference, [9] . We will confine our comments here to specific issues relevant to the comparison of the different risk assessment methodologies.
The CF approach takes great care in defining boundaries of the storage region, out from which CO 2 or brine flow is considered leakage. In the CF analysis, the lateral boundaries of the storage region were defined in two different ways to honor the temporal aspects of the system relative to production of the natural gas resource in the reservoir at Krechba. While production of the gas is ongoing the lateral boundary of the storage region for the next 20 years was considered to extend from the edge of the gas cap to the lease boundary. For the following 10 years, the lateral boundary of the storage region will be considered bounded by the lease boundary all around the anticline. The significance of this for the CF is that for the next 20 years, the natural gas is vulnerable to degradation by CO 2 migration from the water leg into the gas cap, whereas natural gas is no longer considered a resource following cessation of natural gas production (20 years from now). The top boundary of the storage region was taken as the C20.7 (hot shale) due to its distinctiveness and likely sealing capability as evidenced by lack of mud losses during drilling. CO 2 fluxes are not likely to occur across the lease boundary due to the tendency for migration up dip into the natural gas cap, which is undergoing steady depletion. Leaking wells and fault/fracture flow are the only potential pathways for leakage out the top of the storage region. As for the use of the lease boundary for the storage region, the rationale is that fluxes across this boundary may occur, but there are no impacts to such fluxes and thus one can say the leakage risk is negligible.
In the evaluation of risk, measures of likelihood are needed even when quantification of likelihood is not practical or possible. The CF project has defined some terminology to describe approximate likelihoods as shown in Table 1 . Additional terminology qualitatively describing impact and risk were used in the CF analysis. The overall CLR as determined by the CF methods using the data available is estimated as low for the In Salah JIP Storage Project at Krechba. The largest risk is to USDW by CO 2 leakage into wells via poorly cemented annuli and a subsequent subsurface blowout via casing defects. Available research indicates such an event has less than a 1% probability over the project life. However given the known poor seal integrity at several suspended legacy appraisal wells within the lease area, this probability is likely higher at Krechba. Further details of results and recommendations are given in Oldenburg et al. (2010) .
Temporal Risk Exposure -QRTT Technique
An important approach for integrity risk management is to assess the temporal change in risk across a CO 2 storage lifetime. Understanding not only "what" are the integrity risks, but also "when in time" these risks are increasing/decreasing and "where in the storage system" each risk may occur, allows responsible, cost-based project decisions to be made. The QRTT (Quantitative Risk Through Time) technique is an internal BP methodology that evaluates the relationship between the risk mechanisms for CO 2 loss (derived in a similar manner as a RISQUE risk workshop) and the stochastically forecasted, changing dynamics of the storage system (i.e. formation pressure, fluid chemistry).
The In Salah QRTT analysis was carried out over three pathways to represent the risk mechanisms from the three injectors. The URS 2008 RISQUE risk assessment outputs were used to populate the QRTT tool. To assign pressure dependency on the various risks, it was assumed that the likelihoods for relevant risk were judged at the maximum likely pressure that the risk mechanism would experience.
The temporal risk analysis of the In Salah CO 2 storage project is displayed as a series of risk curves for cumulative risk, overburden integrity, well integrity and lateral leakage (Figure 4) . The temporal risk output shows that the heightened leakage risk for the project occurs during the operational (injection) phase. The majority of risk is a consequence of the high injection pressure relative to the low permeability and small pressure window of operation for the In Salah Project. The key risk controlling this is migration direction. Well leakage risk is moderate through the 1000 year risk period. Seeing maximum risk in the operational stages of a project is an ideal scenario, as the ability to respond to risk is easiest when all wells are still accessible, and facilities and expertise are at hand to manage any required activity 
Discussion
In principle both the RISQUE QRA and the CF have a number of similarities which lend themselves to the task of effective communication. Both simplify the complex architecture of a storage project. In the case of CF it separates the problem into compartments and intersecting pathways, assessing their probability against an established acceptable leakage impact. In the case of the RISQUE QRA, this is achieved through the rigorous identification of risks and their quantification displayed in a histogram against predefined targets. Both methodologies provide a means to communicate simply to regulators and the public. Equally they retain the linkage to the complex workflows, simulations and geological assessments necessary to properly characterize a project which is documented within the RISQUE QRA process and recreated through an auditable process by an independent expert group in the case of the CF. The QRTT as an evolution of the RISQUE QRA process also shares these qualities. Additionally through the assessment of risk over time it provides an additional benefit of establishing possible alternative outcomes. QRTT also provides documentable workflow processes and rigorous uncertainty assessment.
Both RISQUE QRA and CF differ in their possible implementation. The RISQUE QRA, through the process of expert panel workshop, provides a means to establish consensus within the storage team as to the principle risks and hence provides a common basis to conclude and evaluate possible response actions. The QRTT explores this through modeling of the time steps of migration and risk progression. The RISQUE QRA provides a testable model to evaluate the impact of possible response actions on risks (see fig. 3 ). The CF on the other hand is an ideal independent assessment suitable to assure external stakeholders of the robustness of the storage project in this respect it represents a check for suitability of a project for storage.
Conclusions
Overall both CF and RISQUE QRA methodologies were consistent and provided useful insights into the In Salah project. Recommendations on responses were remarkably complementary and informative. The key risks identified were equivalent although relative magnitudes were not consistent due to differences in definition of impact. In the case of northerly migration beyond the Krechba hydrocarbon lease, RISQUE QRA defines its impact through volume of CO 2 leaking out of the defined container only and not on the impact on the resources beyond that lease line. On the other hand the CF considers the likelihood of impact of the leakage on the resources beyond the lease, which were sufficiently far as to have low impact. This is opposed to potential leakage into the potable water (USDW) which would have a much more definable impact both in terms of the flux out of the upper boundary in the case of RISQUE QRA as well as for the CF intersection of "proxy" concentrations on the USDW compartment.
The exercise in evaluating these risk methodologies in an established storage project has underlined the importance of risk assessment particularly as an iterative process that advances the project evaluation and response as the project evolves. These methodologies also provide efficient communication tools that retains the complexity both for the internal teams and as well as the external stakeholders.
